Executive Summary

• Arafat's conduct following the Camp David Summit indicates he preferred not to face up to the tough decisions necessary for a historic compromise.
• Instead of responsibility for the welfare of the governed we see him willing to use Palestinian suffering, including the death of children on the frontline (shamelessly exploited).
• Rather than take into account Israeli and Jewish sensitivities (side by side with their own legitimate rights) the Palestinians now prefer to stoke the fires of Islamic "Identity Politics" ("al-Quds is in danger") so as to walk away from the negotiations and replace them by international intervention.

• Direct use of violence by Palestinian Police (which Arafat regards, in effect, as the P.A. military forces) in violent clashes. One of the most serious cases, for which P.A. Policemen bear at least a major part of the responsibility, was the lynching of two IDF reservists in Ramallah on October 12,2000.
• Ambivalent attitudes towards terrorism, and at times - outright complicity. Tolerance towards the Hamas helped open the floodgates of the terrorist campaign of February-March 1996; In the current crisis, P.A. Preventive Security, let alone the "Tanzim" (militia) of Arafat's Fatah movement, are actively involved in terrorist attacks and security cooperation has been abandoned almost entirely.
• Failure to collect illegal weapons - thousands of which were left, from 1994 onwards in the hands of the Tanzim. Various illegal weapons were sighted in the territories in recent events and during demonstrations and funerals.
• Incitement to Hatred - a key element in the current crisis has been the relentless effort to mobilize "the Arab masses and destabilize the region - asking "where is Saladin"? This comes against the background of a broader pattern of education and public messages, which denigrate the Jews, and reject the possibility of compromise solutions.
• The size of the Palestinian Police force- well over 40,000 on the payroll - remains in breach of the Interim Agreement.
• Palestinian Security Organs Operate Outside the Agreed Areas - particularly Preventive Security, acting in East Jerusalem in open breach of the agreements.
• In Gaza Airport, there have been repeated cases of misconduct, which raise questions regarding the illegal use of the Airport.
• On Foreign Relations, the P.A. has been acting in breach of the agreements as to its interim status.
  
• Economic and Infrastructure agreements and procedures have been regularly ignored.
• Criminal activities on a large scale - from car theft to excise tax fraud - take place under P.A. auspices.
• In the recent crisis, the P.A. failed to protect Jewish Holy places in Nablus and Jericho.

Table of Contents:

1. Why were formal commitments important in the post-1993 peace process?
2. Indications of Essential Bad Faith: Arafat creates a rationale for non-compliance
3. Specific aspects of non-compliance
   • Direct Use of Violence:
     • In the recent crisis;
     • At all times (abductions of Israeli citizens, etc.).
     • Terrorism - ambivalence and complicity
     • Failure to Collect Illegal Weapons.
     • Incitement and the Perpetuation of Hatred.
   • Other Aspects of Palestinian non-compliance:
     • The size of the Palestinian Police
     • Security Organs Operating Outside Agreed Areas
     • Breaches of the Agreed Practice at the Gaza (Dahaniyah) Airport
     • No Action to Implement Policy on Visitors Permits
     • Foreign Relations
     • Economic and Infrastructure Breaches
     • Criminal Activity under P.A. Auspices
     • Failure to Protect Holy Places
4. The Shattered Assumptions
   • An Irreversible Choice for Peace;
   • A Stake in the Welfare of the Governed;
   • Give and Take at the Bilateral Table.
5. Root Causes
   • Arafat's Strategy of Avoiding Choices;
   • Diverting Attention from Domestic Failure;
   • Conspiracy Theories and Miscalculations.

Since September 1993 the P.L.O., as an organization, became a signatory to the Declaration of Principles and Israel's negotiating partner. This meant that on a broad set of issues, formal commitments were needed - to try and ensure, as much as possible, that the P.L.O. leadership had clearly broken with past positions, practices and patterns of bad faith, which had marked its conduct as a coalition of "Fidai" (i.e. terrorist) organizations.

At various points in their history, the P.L.O. and its constituent organizations were committed to a strategy of eliminating Israel as a state, (this strategy was embodied, at the time, in the Palestinian National Covenant). They were implicated in: -

• Extensive terrorist activity;
• Breach of agreements and understandings reached with host Arab states;
• Abuse and misgovernment in the zones which their "State within a State" controlled in Lebanon.

Against the mounting evidence of bad faith, as detailed below, .Israel - and other parties engaged in the negotiations - kept alive the hope for a stable peace, based on the assumption that the process, and its momentum, would modify Arafat's stance on compliance and on the question of violence as an option. This hope has now been shattered.

As early as Arafat's own speech on the White House lawn, on September 13, 1993, there were indications that for him, the D.O.P. did not necessarily signify an end to the conflict. He did not, at any point, relinquish his uniform, symbolic of his status as a revolutionary commander; moreover, in terms of the broader historic "narrative", as distinct from the official position at the negotiating table, the map of "Palestine" remained as it has always been for him, the entire territory of pre-1948 mandatory Palestine (as the attached photograph, of an August 22 1999 visit to a school, clearly indicates[photo from Al-Hayat al-Jadida showing Arafat standing next to such a map].

On various occasions, Arafat continued to use the language of "Jihad", literally a "Struggle", but in the specific (religiously colored) context of the Palestinian struggle, a clear reference to the violent option. Thus, in a eulogy to a Palestinian official – on June 15 1995 (at the height of the Oslo Process) - he paid homage, among others, to two women terrorists (Dalal al-Mughrabi and 'Abir Wahidi); and spoke of the children throwing stones as "the Palestinian Generals". He also swore to his audience (which was clearly sympathetic with the Hamas) that "the oath is firm to continue this difficult Jihad, this long Jihad, in the path of martyrs, the path of sacrifices".

Of special interest, in this context, are Arafat's repeated references to the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah, signed by the Prophet Muhammad with his Meccan enemies when they were still stronger than him, and then abandoned (as he conquered the city) within a much shorter time than the Treaty itself warranted. The first such reference made public came shortly after the signing of the Interim agreement, in the "Jihad" speech he made at the Mosque in Johannesburg (obtained by the Jewish community, and broadcast in Israel in May 1994).

What Hudaybiyyah means for him was made even clearer when he spoke, a few months later, on the occasion of the anniversary of the fire in al-Aqsa (an event, in 1968, caused by an Australian madman, but often used in Palestinian propaganda as proof of Israel's evil intentions).

"Did the Prophet, Allah's Messenger, the Last of the Prophets, really accept a humiliation [as "umar bin al-khattab blamed him?] No, and no again. He did not accept a humiliation. But every situation has its own circumstances" (Palestinian Television, August 21, 1995).

The reference to the Hudaybiyyah treaty re-surfaced in 1998, coupled with the warning that "all the options are open to the Palestinian people". (Orbit television, April 18, 1998). In essence, here was a rationale for accepting Oslo and the place at the negotiations, and the various commitments involved, not as the building blocks of trust and cooperation but as temporary measures, to be shed off when circumstances allow.